Trilateral Possibilities: Russian hints at a Modi-Putin-Xi summit signal new diplomatic alignments in response to global economic pressures.
By Annapurna Nautiyal
August, 29, 2025: In the wake of escalating trade wars triggered by U.S. President Donald Trump’s policies, global alignments are undergoing visible shifts. India, caught between long-standing ties with Russia, strained relations with China, and a complicated partnership with the United States, is recalibrating its strategies to secure national interests. The following analysis looks at recent diplomatic moves, trilateral possibilities, and the continuing challenge of China’s assertiveness.
Meanwhile, the Russian envoy to India had hinted at the possibility of a trilateral meeting between Modi, Xi Jinping and Putin very soon to discuss strategies to confront such challenges. The Russian envoy also called the sanctions unjustified, pressure tactics, deception, and disrespect of the national interests of a country like India, which the US considers a close friend.
The emphasis on regional stability, which was dependent on the relationship of the three big countries of the region—Russia, India and China—clearly signalled the emergence of new possibilities under Trump’s trade war, despite many suspicions and differences between India and China. This has also allowed India to strengthen its time-tested, decades-old relationship with Russia.
India’s National Security Advisor Shri Ajit Doval and India’s Foreign Minister, after their recent visits to Russia, confirmed that President Putin would very soon visit India. Prime Minister Modi also held telephonic conversations with President Putin on matters of mutual interest, and Putin also called Modi after the Alaska summit. Putin subsequently spoke to Chinese President Xi Jinping after talking to Modi.
China expressed happiness on Prime Minister Modi’s forthcoming visit to China for the SCO (Shanghai Cooperation Organisation) meeting at Tianjin, scheduled from August 31 to September 1, 2025. Both Russia and China’s announcement of importing Indian produce amidst the US tariff war on India has provided relief to India. Modi’s visit to China will be his first in seven years to hold bilateral talks with Xi Jinping, and with the Russian President’s plan for a trilateral summit in the wake of the US trade war on all three, a new equation among the most affected countries is emerging.
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The above scenario clearly highlights the circumstances and America’s neo-conservative policies under which these new developments are taking place. Prior to this, during the 16th BRICS Summit in Kazan, Russia, held on October 23, 2024, India and China had agreed on a patrolling arrangement along the disputed Ladakh border after four years of tense relations. This declaration emphasised equitable global governance, peace-building, and enhanced cooperation among Global South nations.
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It was attended by both Prime Minister Narendra Modi and President Xi Jinping, and both pledged to reduce tensions along the border and make good use of the Special Representative Mechanism (SRM) on the India-China border issue, constituted to promote a peaceful, diplomatic and fair solution to the matter. The Chinese side also stressed an increased focus on development as a shared goal and urged China and India to see each other as development prospects rather than threats. They also agreed to disengage troops at the friction points of the LAC and to resume the Kailash Mansarovar Yatra from the summer of 2025.
Though this does not signal that India-China relations have been normalised after the Galwan conflict, this shift is in line with national interests, as all four major countries of BRICS are sailing in the same boat; therefore, unity among them is the need of the hour.
The SCO meeting is likely to bring both leaders closer, which will be good for the unity of BRICS during this phase of trade wars, and India’s readiness for negotiations until border peace and tranquillity are not disturbed. This meeting might pave the way for the resumption of direct flights, removal of Chinese restrictions on manpower and equipment imports to India, as well as China’s support for India’s BRICS presidency.
China has also kept its reactions muted towards India’s first joint patrolling of the South China Sea with the Philippines. Russia, as a member of BRICS, also aspires to closeness with both China and India in view of the US trade war. The visit of the Chinese Foreign Minister to India and his meetings with India’s Foreign Minister and National Security Advisor have further strengthened this, but India also aspires to maintain its long-cultivated relationship with the US, despite the US stance during Operation Sindoor of not isolating Pakistan for promoting terror activities in India.
The second hosting of Pakistan’s rogue Army Chief, Field Marshal Asim Munir, by the US—who declared during his recent US visit that if Pakistan goes down, it will take half of the world down, and repeated that Kashmir is the jugular vein of Pakistan and an unresolved international dispute—has offended India. India strongly condemned such remarks made in a third friendly country, and nuclear blackmail to destroy India prompted the US to declare that its policies remain unchanged towards India and Pakistan.
India still seeks a relationship with the US, described as one of the most defining partnerships of the 21st century and renamed by Trump as TRUST (Transforming the Relationship Utilising Strategic Technology), despite the fact that trust is presently missing. Though no longer trustworthy, on India’s Independence Day the Trump administration’s message stated that despite imposing trade tariffs, the historic relationship between India and the US is far-reaching and bound by a shared vision for a more peaceful, prosperous, and secure Indo-Pacific region.
Chinese Challenges
However, despite such assurances, U.S. policies in a fast-changing scenario have become complex for India, as re-hyphenating India with Pakistan, H-1B visa restrictions, and other measures could cause lasting damage to its relationship with the United States. While the U.S. considers India an important country, its attitude towards the China-Pakistan axis and financial and military support to Pakistan demands caution in dealing with Washington.
China, despite showing eagerness towards a thaw in its relations with India and promising to ease restrictions on the export of rare earth materials, is extending its railway network up to the Aksai Chin area near the LAC to connect China’s Xinjiang province to Tibet—one part of which runs alongside the LAC. This project is being implemented even as Modi’s forthcoming meeting with the Chinese premier is expected to ease tensions; on the ground, nothing has changed in India-China relations, as China has neither stopped constructing the dam on the Brahmaputra River near Arunachal Pradesh nor withdrawn its troops from Eastern Ladakh.
Though U.S. pressure has accelerated the need for a united front, trust among the major countries of the group still needs to be cultivated. China has reservations about India’s participation in the Quadrilateral Malabar naval exercises, which aim to enhance security cooperation and promote a free, inclusive, and open Indo-Pacific region. The July 2025 summit of Quad Foreign Ministers, which saw an agreement on critical minerals to strengthen economic security, opportunity, prosperity, and collective resilience, has made China uncomfortable.
Chinese opposition to India as a dominant power in South Asia is aimed at testing India’s endurance and reliability in supporting smaller neighbours. Yet, despite tense relations, China has not stopped trade with India due to its lucrative nature. Official Chinese data shows that India had a trade surplus with China from 2003 to 2005, but this reversed thereafter. In 2005, India exported $10 billion worth of goods to China, which increased to $14.9 billion in 2024, while imports from China grew tenfold—from $10 billion to over $100 billion during the same period.
Over the past 15 years, India’s imports from China grew 2.3 times faster than India’s total imports from all other countries. Campaigns to boycott made-in-China goods or target Chinese firms have also failed to significantly impact Sino-India trade. While India exports mostly primary commodities, China exports heavy machinery, power-related equipment, nuclear reactors, telecom equipment, organic chemicals, pharmaceuticals, textiles, automobiles, metal products, and fertilizers. Over the past 15 years, India’s imports of these products from China have increased by 215 percent, while India’s exports to China have been restricted due to Chinese market-access limitations for agriculture, pharmaceuticals, IT, and other professional services.
China has also been shrewdly exporting cheap, low-quality steel to India, resulting in almost a 60 percent increase in domestic demand. Chinese companies exploit India’s free trade agreements with Japan and ASEAN countries, using subsidiaries to flood the Indian market with low-cost steel. China continues to obstruct India’s developmental path through restrictions on fertilizer and rare earth magnet exports and by recalling its engineers from iPhone factories in India, leaving India with limited recourse. India’s reluctance to open its markets for the RCEP (Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership), due to concerns of dumping Chinese manufactured goods, has further aggravated tensions.
The Chinese challenge to India is neither new nor fundamentally altered by changes in global politics. China’s aggression towards India, despite the 2003 Declaration on Principles for Relations and Comprehensive Cooperation and agreements on border trade—which paved the way for Tibet to be recognized as part of China and Sikkim as part of India—is unsurprising, given China’s strategic ambitions. China’s material support to insurgency movements in India’s Northeast aims to disturb peace and harmony. India’s Act East policy under Prime Minister Narendra Modi is a countermeasure, but China’s aggressive encirclement of regional countries through aid, loans, and infrastructure has limited India’s options to confront the Chinese challenge, especially given India’s border vulnerabilities despite the Vibrant Villages Scheme.
Conclusion
India has realized that, to act as a security provider in the Indian Ocean Region (IOR), it must enhance its connecting role with South Asian and Southeast Asian countries. The rail connectivity from Kanyakumari to Kashmir has already demonstrated India’s resolve.
Anti-terror treaties with the UAE, garnering support from Central Asian countries to jointly combat terrorism, and the development of Iran’s Chabahar port are also positive steps. India must handle Chinese pressures strategically, recognizing that meekness will not yield results, and explore all opportunities to strengthen relationships with other countries, particularly Russia.
India also needs to actively cultivate good relations with its immediate neighbours and implement fully functional free trade agreements, such as SAFTA (South Asia Free Trade Agreement), and FTAs with New Zealand, the U.S., the European Union (EU), Oman, Peru, Qatar, and Sri Lanka, covering tariff reductions in manufacturing, agriculture, services, data localization, intellectual property rights, investment promotion, facilitation, and protection.
Similarly, the Free Trade Agreement (FTA) finalized on May 6, 2025, between India and the United Kingdom, as well as other FTAs like the ASEAN-India Trade Area (AIFTA), must be fully operational. The recent FTA agreement between India and the Eurasian Economic Union is also a positive step. The shift towards regional supply chains, influenced by geopolitical changes, requires India’s FTA strategies to align with global trade dynamics.
Carefulness, caution, preparedness, border-area development through infrastructure, healthy relations with neighbours, and smart, reliable alliances will be key to success. Over-reliance on China for any of these would be a mistake, as China has the ability to change the geopolitical game at any moment.
Still, these challenges have initiated new thinking and the possibility of emerging realignments in the Asia-Pacific. Given the uncertain and unclear U.S. policies, it makes sense for Russia, India, and China to join hands to make the U.S. realize the limits of its power and to benefit from such partnerships.
(Annapurna Nautiyal is Former Vice Chancellor, HNB Garhwal Central University, Srinagar, Garhwal, Uttarakhand)
