Governance gaps, unmet promises, and rising dissatisfaction among rural voters eroded Lalduhoma-led ZPM’s dominance in the Lai region. Internal rifts, candidate choices, and a stronger opposition alliance tightened the race and shifted momentum away from the ruling party.
Navin Upadhyay
December 10, 2025: Barely a month after the Mizo National Front (MNF)’s razor-thin win in the Dampa Assembly bypoll on November 14—where its candidate R. Lalthangliana defeated Zoram People’s Movement (ZPM) nominee Vanlalsailova by just 562 votes—the hills of southern Mizoram have delivered another shock. The Lai Autonomous District Council (LADC) results, declared on December 9, saw ZPM slump to six seats in the 25-member body, trailing behind MNF’s eight and the Indian National Congress (INC)’s seven.
These back-to-back setbacks, coming soon after ZPM’s euphoric 2023 landslide, expose a political fragility that had been masked by the party’s anti-corruption momentum. The Dampa loss, in a seat ZPM had snatched in 2023, shattered its aura of invincibility and emboldened opponents. By the time voters turned out in force for the LADC poll (83.99%), the narrative had already shifted—from ZPM as Mizoram’s inevitable future to a novice regime struggling to convert statewide goodwill into administrative trust.
In Mizoram’s layered governance system, where assembly politics, district councils, and tribal aspirations intertwine like tributaries of the Tlawng River, these defeats signal more than tactical missteps. They reveal deeper vulnerabilities in sustaining momentum across diverse constituencies shaped by ethnic loyalties, local grievances, and uneven development.
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LADC Results: Fragmented Mandate, Fierce Contest
The LADC—one of Mizoram’s Sixth Schedule councils responsible for education, health, and land administration in the Lai-dominated Lawngtlai district—witnessed an intense contest. Eighty-two candidates, including only one woman, fought for 25 seats. The outcome underscored a fractured electorate:
- MNF: 8 seats – Down from 20 in 2020 but still the largest bloc. Senior leader V.L. Hmuaka retained Lawngtlai Vengpui.
- INC: 7 seats – A remarkable leap from one seat in 2020. Leader C. Ngunlianchunga captured both Lawngtlai Vengpui and Bualpui West.
- ZPM: 6 seats – Despite contesting all 25 seats, expectations outpaced performance. Defectors like T. Zakunga delivered wins in Vawmbuk, but the overall debut was muted.
- Others: BJP (2), Independents (2) – The BJP held ground through incumbent CEM N. Zangura, while independents like former ZPM aspirant V. Zirsanga peeled away crucial votes.
Turnout exceeded 80% across the council area—mirroring Dampa’s high participation—and reflected voter eagerness to course-correct. No party crossed double digits, pointing to a polarized mandate and a public reluctant to give ZPM a blank cheque.
Lalduhoma’s Fortress Crumbles: ZPM Routed in LADC Polls https://t.co/G5f6pLkdV0 #LADCElection2025 #ZPMShockLoss#LalduhomaSetback #MNFCongressComeback#LaiCouncilUpset #MizoramPolitics2025
— POWER CORRIDORS (@power_corridors) December 9, 2025
Why ZPM Stumbled
A quiet opposition understanding—what ZPM minister B. Lalchhanzova described as an MNF-INC-BJP “informal front”—played a subtle but influential role. On the ground, tactical vote-sharing, mutual restraint and a shared desire to dent ZPM’s dominance helped consolidate anti-incumbent sentiment. The earlier Dampa bypoll had already cracked ZPM’s aura of invincibility, signalling to rivals that the ruling party was no longer unassailable. That psychological shift mattered as much as the vote share.
Governance fatigue also shaped the outcome. The outgoing MNF-led Lai Council had seen four leadership changes in five years, stalled budgets and slow implementation of development schemes. ZPM’s brief influence through ally V. Zirsanga didn’t yield visible improvements. Long-standing frustrations—including deteriorating roads, weak health facilities in Chakma areas and unresolved land disputes—overpowered party narratives. For voters, this election became a verdict on delivery, not ideology.
Internal choices further hurt ZPM. Fielding candidates in every seat triggered unexpected fissures, especially after the party denied a ticket to experienced leader V. Zirsanga, who contested as an independent and won. Bringing in defectors like former BJP leader T. Zakunga unsettled core supporters. Meanwhile, the Congress leaned on familiar, trusted faces, giving it a steadier base.
A deeper structural mismatch also became evident. ZPM’s momentum is still strongest among Aizawl’s urban middle class, drawn to Lalduhoma’s reformist and anti-establishment persona. But the Lai region remains agrarian, conservative and historically aligned with MNF’s ethnic-identity politics. Here, ZPM’s broader promise of a unified “Zoram” felt distant compared to immediate anxieties—agricultural distress, uncertain border trade prospects and youth unemployment.
Finally, rising anti-incumbency and inflated expectations weighed heavily. After nearly two years in power, ZPM confronts the everyday grind of governance: inflation, slow-moving infrastructure projects and unfulfilled commitments such as expanded job quotas. The Dampa setback sharpened the perception that the party was vulnerable, even inexperienced. For many voters, the Lai Council election offered a low-risk chance to signal dissatisfaction ahead of the more consequential 2027 local body polls.
Border Politics: Loud Resolutions, Quiet Compliance
The ZPM government’s handling of the Indo-Myanmar border fencing issue has also stirred unease. Despite passing resolutions opposing the Centre’s fencing push and writing multiple protest letters in 2024, critics argue the government’s resistance has been restrained—more symbolic than confrontational.
Home Minister K. Sapdanga reiterated opposition in August 2025 but acknowledged that surveys for feasibility were proceeding with the state’s cooperation. With no mass mobilization, legal challenge, or administrative pushback, civil society groups like the Zo Re-Unification Organisation (ZORO) have taken the lead in protesting.
In border-adjacent Lai district—where fencing threatens farmland and kinship ties—this perceived ambivalence likely deepened ZPM’s losses in both Dampa and LADC. The party’s diplomatic balancing act between Delhi’s expectations and Zo sentiment has increasingly been read as timidity.
The LADC verdict does not endanger ZPM’s state government—Lalduhoma still commands a solid majority—but it punctures the myth of invincibility. The MNF, though diminished, has regained moral footing. The INC’s revival suggests a return to a three-cornered contest. The BJP remains peripheral in Christian-majority Mizoram but retains a foothold through strategic pockets.
For ZPM, the challenge is twofold:
- Bridge the urban-rural divide by investing in Lai-specific needs and empowering local leaders.
- Rebuild organisational coherence by correcting candidate-selection missteps and repairing internal fractures.
As one analyst remarked after Dampa, these polls mark “ZPM’s first real stress test—passing it requires humility, not hubris.”
In Mizoram’s intricate web of councils, clans, and identities, Lalduhoma’s reformist vision must now deliver tangible, on-ground results. The hills have spoken—twice, and clearly. The question is whether ZPM can listen, adapt, and turn tactical setbacks into strategic renewal.
