As India strengthens its ties with Chin resistance groups, the Kuki-Zo find themselves at the center of a larger geopolitical game. Will this alliance empower them or further inflame ethnic tensions in Manipur?
BY Navin Upadhyay
Recent revelations that Mizoram Chief Minister Lalduhoma brokered a deal between two rival rebel factions in Myanmar’s Chin State, at the behest of the Indian government, will be welcome news to the Kuki-Zo community in Manipur.
This development highlights that New Delhi cannot risk the repeat of May 3,2023 in Manipur against the Christian Kuki-Zo population, given its strategic stakes in Myanmar. Reports suggest that India is actively working to unite rival Chin rebel groups to oppose the Myanmar military junta, a move that aligns with broader geopolitical goals.
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Chin State, a Christian-majority region, shares cultural and religious ties with Mizoram and the Kuki-Zo community. Lalduhoma’s role in facilitating talks between the Chin Land Council (CLC) and its armed wing, the Chin National Army (CNA), and the Interim Chin National Consultative Council (ICNCC) and its armed wing, the Chin Brotherhood, culminated in the formation of the Unified Chin National Council (CNC) on February 26, 2025. The Power Corridors was one of the first to break the news, reporting it on March 1.
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The negotiations, hosted in Mizoram, were part of a mission Lalduhoma described as his own, though reports indicate close coordination with India’s Ministry of External Affairs and his political advisor, Lalmuanpuia Punte.
Additionally, Mizoram’s Rajya Sabha member K. Vanlalvena (MNF) reportedly engaged with Myanmar’s Arakan Army (AA) and attended a high-level meeting at the Indian Council for World Affairs (ICWA) in New Delhi, alongside representatives from Chin, Arakan, and Kachin rebel groups. These efforts highlight India’s deep involvement with Myanmar’s insurgent movements.
Given Lalduhoma’s active advocacy for the unification of the Kuki-Zo community and his strong ties with them, the developments related to Myanmar are bound to resonate in Manipur. His role in facilitating negotiations among Chin rebel factions aligns with India’s broader strategic interests in the region, but it also has significant implications for the ethnic and political landscape of Manipur.
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India’s Broader Strategic Vision
India’s push to unify Chin State’s rebel factions against the Myanmar junta is driven by several key objectives:
- Creating a Buffer Against China
China exerts significant influence in Myanmar, supporting groups like the United Wa State Army (UWSA) and the Kachin Independence Army (KIA) in regions such as Kachin State and Shan State. By fostering a united Chin resistance aligned with Indian interests, New Delhi aims to counter China’s dominance in Myanmar’s western regions and establish a buffer zone along its northeastern borders. - Safeguarding the Kaladan Multi-Modal Transit Project
The Kaladan Project, connecting Mizoram to Myanmar’s Rakhine State via Chin State, is a critical trade route giving India access to the Bay of Bengal and reducing reliance on the vulnerable Siliguri Corridor. A unified Chin force under India’s influence could secure this corridor against disruptions from the Myanmar military or hostile insurgents. - Bolstering Ties with Pro-India Ethnic Groups
India has historically supported ethnic rebel groups like the NSCN (Naga insurgents) operating across India and Myanmar. Uniting the Chin factions strengthens ties with another ethnic group naturally aligned with Mizoram and Nagaland, expanding India’s influence inside Myanmar. - Curbing Myanmar’s Support for Northeast Indian Insurgents
The Myanmar military (Tatmadaw) has long provided safe havens to Indian insurgent groups like the United Liberation Front of Asom (ULFA) and the People’s Liberation Army of Manipur (PLA). A strong Chin resistance could pressure the junta, limiting its capacity to harbor insurgents threatening India’s Northeast. - Countering the Arakan Army in Rakhine State
The Arakan Army (AA), a China-backed rebel group in Rakhine State, seeks autonomy and could jeopardize India’s access to the Kaladan Project and Sittwe Port if it gains control. A united Chin force could act as India’s proxy to challenge the AA and protect its trade interests. - Leveraging a Christian Ally in Myanmar
With Chin State’s Christian majority mirroring the demographics of Mizoram and Nagaland, India may be cultivating a Christian-led resistance as a reliable, pro-India foothold in Myanmar, potentially shaping the country’s internal politics. - Weakening the Junta to Push for Federalism
Like the U.S., India may favor a federal Myanmar where ethnic states like Chin, Kachin, and Karen gain autonomy. A weakened military junta, forced to negotiate with rebel factions, would pave the way for India to deepen its influence in Myanmar’s western regions.
Implications for the Kuki-Zo Community
The Kuki-Zo community and the Chin State rebels share strong ethnic, cultural, and historical ties, as they belong to the same broader Tibeto-Burman ethnic group. The Kuki, Zo, and Chin people are often considered part of the same ethnic continuum, spread across India’s Northeast (Manipur, Mizoram, Nagaland, Assam, and Tripura), Myanmar’s Chin State, and parts of Bangladesh. These groups share linguistic similarities, a common ancestry, and predominantly Christian beliefs, which further strengthen their bond.
Incidentally, several Kuki and Chin insurgent groups have historically collaborated. It is well known that the Chin National Army (CNA), one of the main rebel groups in Myanmar’s Chin State, has coordinated operations with Kuki armed groups in India, such as the Kuki National Army (KNA-B). There have been reports of Kuki-Zo fighters from Manipur and Mizoram joining the Chin resistance against the Myanmar junta.
Under the circumstances, despite Home Minister Amit Shah’s order to restore free movement along the national highway, the use of harsh force against the Kuki-Zo seems improbable, given India’s Myanmar initiative. However, the Meiteis are not pleased with this development. Several prominent Meitei voices, along with their volunteers and civil society groups, are openly criticizing the role of the Mizoram Chief Minister in brokering the deal between the Chin rebel factions.”
Ultimately, the intersection of Mizoram’s policies, India’s strategic calculations, and Myanmar’s internal conflicts will shape the political landscape of Manipur in the months to come.
